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1.  INTRODUCTION
1 
It has been argued that the structure of tax-benefit systems in OECD countries has been the 
cause of labour market problems (for instance OECD, 1997a). In particular, there is a concern 
that tax-benefit systems create incentives that negatively affect the behaviour of both 
employees and firms. On the demand side, high tax burdens can increase the cost of labour 
while on the supply side, high marginal tax rates reduce the reward for additional work efforts 
at the intensive margin. At the extensive margin, generous out of work benefit payments are 
seen to lead to reduced efforts to seek gainful employment or remain in work (Snower, 1997). 
These disincentives have been named as one of the main causes of slack economic growth and 
unemployment (European Commission, 2000). 
Using a new EU-wide microsimulation model, it is possible to compare across countries the 
combined effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes both in and out of work. While 
Immervoll (2002) has analysed distributions of marginal and average effective tax burdens 
faced by employees, the present paper focuses on the role of taxes and benefits on household 
incomes during transitions into and out of work. In particular, we provide detailed measures 
of so-called net replacement rates (the ratio of out of work income to in work income). 
Net replacement rates (NRRs) provide a useful starting point for identifying to what extent 
workers are protected from income loss due to unemployment. This is important in order to 
evaluate whether benefit systems provide households with a sufficient amount of resources 
during periods of employment transitions. At the same time, NRRs allow us to address the 
question whether the financial gains to employment may be insufficient and, importantly, why 
this may be the case. By relating NRRs to information recorded in rich mico-data sets, we can 
analyse the factors behind observed NRR levels (such as wage and benefit levels or household 
composition). 
To address these questions, a micro-based analysis is essential. However, calculations based 
on average or “typical” households often provide a useful first step in any comparative 
analysis. For instance, the OECD provide regular assessments of both gross and net 
replacement rates across OECD countries for a range of family types (e.g., OECD, 2002). 
Another useful background to the present analysis is the series of studies (OECD, 1997a, 
1997b) highlighting the significance of the so-called unemployment trap. 
                                                 
1 Address for correspondence: Microsimulation Unit, Department of Applied Economics, University of 
Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DE, UK. Email: h.immervoll@econ.cam.ac.uk, 
cathal.odonoghue@nuigalway.ie. A version of the paper is also available in the EUROMOD Working Paper 
Series (www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm).    3
This paper extends the developmental work carried out for four EU countries in Immervoll 
and O’Donoghue (forthcoming (a)) that quantified the distribution of NRRs for a selected 
number of individual and household characteristics and Immervoll and O’Donoghue 
(forthcoming (b)) that developed a method for decomposing NRRs into the factors that drive 
them. These papers documented the extent to which younger people, women, households with 
more than one adult and households with children in general had higher NRRs and 
highlighted the impact different income sources have on the distribution of NRRs in these 
countries. In this paper we extend the analysis to 13 countries of the EU. 
We first derive NRR averages and distributions for employment transitions into and out of 
work. The microsimulation model is used to compute the counterfactual income situations 
(out-of-work benefits for the transition out of work; in-work earnings for the transition into 
full-time employment). Any knock-on effects on other taxes and benefits received by the 
person whose status changes as well as other household members (such as lower income taxes 
in the out-of-work situation) are taken into account. NRRs are derived by comparing the 
counterfactual with the original situation observed in the micro-data. 
In a second step, we take a closer look at what causes observed NRRs. This is done by first 
looking in detail at all relevant income components and how they might change following 
employment transitions. In addition, we formulate a simple regression model where NRRs are 
regressed on a set of individual and household characteristics in order to identify and compare 
associations between them. 
While NRRs are one manifestation of the tax-benefit rules which influence labour supply 
incentives and while microsimulation models can provide very detailed information on the 
budget sets used as an input for labour supply models, this paper does not try to determine 
whether and to what extent these financial incentives determine behaviour. Instead, we report 
the size and distribution of NRRs along with factors that influence them. It is a matter for 
labour micro-econometricians to evaluate the quantitative importance of any associated work 
incentives. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarise the most important 
measurement issues related to quantifying replacement rates. The microsimulation model and 
data are also described here. Section 3 presents the main characteristics of the 13 tax-benefit 
systems in terms of the structure of taxes and benefits as well as their distributional impact. 
NRR simulation results and decompositions are presented in section 4 and discussed in 
section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
Replacement rates are a measure of the degree to which an individuals’ (and their households) 
standard of living while in work is maintained during periods of unemployment. The higher a 
household’s replacement rate, the more protected they are from the impact of losing work 
income. At the same time, however, high replacement rates may reduce peoples’ efforts to 
secure employment. The labour market opportunities that unemployed people face may be 
such that accepting jobs offered to them would not result in any or little financial gain. This 
may be particularly true for low-skilled people. Similarly, those currently employed 
(particularly on low wages) may not lose much by entering (spells of) unemployment.   4
Obviously unemployment benefits play an important role in this.
2 In addition to 
unemployment benefits, many other features of the tax-benefit system will determine the 
difference between incomes in and out of work. A progressive tax system can dampen the 
income loss by making net incomes less variable than gross incomes. For example, 
progressive income taxes on earnings combined with a favourable tax treatment of benefits 
mean that replacement rates before taxes are markedly lower than NRRs, which are measured 
net of tax and contribution payments (OECD 1997a). Benefits that do not depend on income 
or the employment status also smooth income differences between in- and out of work. On the 
other hand, benefits (or tax rebates) that are conditional on employment or a certain minimum 
number of working hours can serve to increase the difference between in-work and out-of-
work incomes. NRRs capture all these influences by taking into account all relevant tax- and 
benefit changes following an employment transition. 
Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001b and forthcoming (b)) describe in some detail the 
analytical choices faced in calculating replacement rates (see also Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1991). The two basic dimensions that are relevant in this context are (1) which income 
components to include in the numerator and the denominator of the replacement rate and for 
whom; and (2) which direction of labour market transition to compute the replacement rate 
for. 
In measuring the degree of income maintenance, we have two main alternatives regarding the 
definition of income. If we see out of work benefits as an insurance system then one could be 
interested in measuring the degree to which in-work incomes are insured. In this case, the 
numerator would be (net) out of work benefit income and the denominator would be (net) 
income from work. Only incomes of the one person whose labour market status changes 
would be taken into account while incomes of any other household members would be 
disregarded. Or one could be interested in the living standard out of work as opposed to in 
work. In this case, both numerator and denominator would also include all other incomes 
including, for example, income from capital and benefits that are independent of work status. 
Also, given the interest in living standards, a household concept will usually be appropriate so 
that incomes of all other household members should be included as well. 
We adopt the latter type of calculation since we regard the question of relative living 
standards the more interesting one. The definition of income considered is disposable income, 
defined as market incomes (employment plus other market incomes) plus benefits minus 
social insurance contributions minus income taxes. Since for twelve of the thirteen countries 
we are looking at, our data contain annual incomes (the exceptions are the UK and Ireland 
where data are weekly), we have chosen the year as the relevant period. 
The existence of other household members, will influence NRR results in two ways. First, the 
larger the number of other household member with incomes, the smaller will be the income 
difference if one person changes between work and unemployment. In comparing results 
across countries one will therefore have to bear in mind differences such as the number of 
                                                 
2 In this context, the generosity of unemployment benefit systems can be relevant even if benefits are not paid 
when unemployment is judged to be ‘voluntary’: Employers may use the unemployment insurance to smooth 
over demand cycles by laying off people when demand is weak and re-employing them when business is 
stronger. There has been some evidence that such temporary layoffs are important phenomena especially in the 
US but also in some European countries. See Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1989).   5
two-earner couples or adult children living with their parents.
3 A second influence will be due 
to the tax-benefit system: the employment status and income of one person may affect taxes 
and benefits of other household members and, thus, total household incomes in- and out of 
work. 
In order to compute the counterfactual income situation for a household, we have to decide 
for which of the household members we want to simulate the employment transition. The 
individuals we consider for the transition are those of working age (18-59). We exclude civil 
servants since they frequently do not face the same unemployment risks and would thus 
complicate comparisons across countries. People in education are also excluded. Of course we 
need to also decide on the type of transition which, in turn, will depend on the person’s 
original employment status observed in the micro-data. For people who are observed to be out 
of work, we will simulate a transition into work as the counterfactual income situation and 
vice versa. Many studies of replacement rates have focused exclusively on the unemployed 
and have computed their current income as a fraction of the prospective income they would 
earn if entering employment (e.g., Salomäki and Munzi, 1999 and O’Donoghue and Utili, 
2000). In the present analysis we consider the following three labour market states: (A) 
employed or self-employed; (B) unemployed; (C) out of work other than unemployed. The 
transitions we simulate are: (1) from A to B (we will call this replacement rate RRab), (2) from 
B to A (RRba) and (3) from C to A (RRca). The sample size for each transition will therefore 
depend on the number of working age people in labour market states A, B and C. Table A2 in 
the annex shows the resulting sample sizes for each transition across countries.
4 
RRab is the “in work” NRR for somebody currently in employment or self-employment 
(perhaps part-time) and moving into full-time unemployment. RRba and RRca represent what 
we call “out of work” NRRs. RRba is the replacement rate for a transition into full-time 
employment applying to those who are currently receiving unemployment benefits or who 
classify themselves as being ‘unemployed’ and seeking work in our data. RRca denotes the 
level of current (net) income relative to the prospective (net) full-time employment income of 
someone currently out of work but not ‘unemployed’. It is, in other words, the out of work 
replacement rate faced by working age individuals who receive neither income from work nor 
unemployment benefits (e.g., ‘inactive’ people; those engaged in unpaid care or domestic 
work; recipients of pensions, disability benefits, social minimum benefits, etc). It is an 
advantage that we can investigate the ‘inactive’ group separately, however one must be very 
cautious in drawing conclusions for this group as a whole as it is very heterogeneous. As a 
result, our analysis will mainly focus on RRab and RRba. 
The transition is assumed to take place at the start of the fiscal year (with the employment 
status remaining unchanged thereafter). As mentioned above, we compare income situations 
in- and out of work over a full year. As a result, we do not currently take into account any 
changes in benefit levels that may occur after a period longer than 12 months following the 
                                                 
3 In computing one measure for the entire household, we implicitly assume equal sharing of resources within the 
household. Where this is not appropriate (e.g., in cases where two family units share one physical household) our 
replacement rate results will tend to underestimate the change in living standards due to employment transitions. 
4 Note that, in cases where micro-data record annual income information, the sample sizes of the three groups 
will generally not sum up to the total number of working age persons because, frequently, people have more than 
one labour market status during the year. In these cases, we simulate all relevant transitions for this person. See 
Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001b) for details.   6
transition.
5 In particular, RRab measures the initial unemployment benefit that people currently 
in work would receive if they became unemployed relative to current in-work income. For all 
transitions, all income components other than the simulated taxes and benefits remain 
unaffected for members of households whose labour market status does not change. In 
addition, we assume that all other household characteristics remain unchanged so that any 
behavioural adaptations (such as the use of childcare services or altering housing decisions) to 
the new employment situation are ignored. 
EUROMOD 
Simulations are run for 13 EU countries (Finland and Sweden are excluded at present). The 
micro data sets underlying the simulations are shown in table A1.
6 The model used to 
simulate replacement rates is EUROMOD, an integrated European tax-benefit model. 
EUROMOD provides us with a Europe-wide perspective on social and fiscal policies that are 
implemented at European or national level. It is also designed to examine, within a consistent 
comparative framework, the impact of national policies on national populations or the 
differential impact of co-ordinated European policy on individual Member States. Within the 
context of the present paper, the most relevant feature of EUROMOD is that it can provide 
conceptually consistent and, thus, comparable output for different countries. See Immervoll 
and O'Donoghue (2001a) and Sutherland (2001) for details about the model and underlying 
data. 
The simulations are based on the systems of tax and benefit rules current in June 1998 and all 
monetary variables in the micro-data are updated from their original value to 1998 using the 
most appropriate uprating index available for each type of variable.
7 In computing total 
disposable incomes, income components that do not lend themselves to simulation ar etaken 
directly from the data (e.g. pensions). The standard tax-benefit instruments simulated in 
EUROMOD and relevant for this exercise are income taxes, social insurance contributions, 
child benefits and other family benefits, and income- or means-tested benefits.
8 Detailed 
                                                 
5 Relevant benefit changes during the 12 months period (such as waiting periods or the expiration of Job Seekers 
Allowance in the UK after, at most, 6 months) are fully taken into account. 
6 EUROMOD relies on micro-data from 11 different sources for fifteen countries. The data sources used for the 
current study are the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) made available by Eurostat; the Austrian 
version of the ECHP made available by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social 
Sciences; the Living in Ireland Survey made available by the Economic and Social Research Institute; the Panel 
Survey on Belgian Households (PSBH) made available by the University of Liège and the University of 
Antwerp; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Finland; the Enquête sur les Budgets 
Familiaux (EBF) made available by INSEE; the public use version of the German Socio Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW95) made available by the Bank of Italy; the Socio-Economic Panel for 
Luxembourg (PSELL-2) made available by CEPS/INSTEAD; the Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SEP) made 
available by Statistics Netherlands through the mediation of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
- Scientific Statistical Agency; and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), made available by the UK Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) through the Data Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and is used by 
permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the 
data reported here. An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data sources and their respective providers cited 
in this acknowledgement. 
7 A new “wave” of EUROMOD data is currently being added to the model and is often “closer” to 1998 than the 
first data available for the model. 
8 In the current exercise, we assume full benefit take-up and no tax evasion.    7
descriptions of the tax-benefit rules built into the model are provided in the “EUROMOD 
country reports” (available through www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm). 
For the present study and as explained above, we also simulate unemployment benefits (for 
the transition out of work).
9 Unemployment benefits in a number of the countries depend 
upon previous income. When simulating the transition from work to unemployment, we 
utilise existing in-work income in the data as previous income. Also some individuals are 
ineligible for unemployment benefits because they were self-employed. Our simulations take 
this into account. However, having no full information on the reasons for unemployment or 
the time in work prior to unemployment, we assume that unemployment is involuntary and 
that people satisfy any contribution requirements (having started work no earlier than at age 
18). In this sense, the computed RRab can be seen as an upper boundary estimate in cases 
where unemployment benefits depend on contribution records. On the other hand, we abstract 
from any early retirement provisions which, in comparison with the unemployment benefit 
system, may provide more generous out-of-work benefits in some countries. 
For transitions into work (RRba, RRca) we know people’s out-of work benefits and instead 
need to simulate in-work earnings (along with all related taxes and benefits) as the 
counterfactual situation. The goal here is not a very precise prediction of potential earnings 
for each individual but to capture the essential features of the distribution of potential entry 
wages reflecting the labour market opportunities of out-of-work people. We use a standard 
(log) earnings model to estimate in-work income for those currently out of work, utilising the 
Heckman (1979) procedure to account for sample selection bias.
10 This method “adjusts” 
coefficients of explanatory variables to account for the possible selection bias associated with 
the fact that we only observe earnings for those who work in data. We estimate separate 
models for men and women. The estimated coefficients and standard deviations are reported 
in table A3. The results of estimating the earnings of the unemployed from these equations 
(for 1998) generally show that they have a lower earnings potential on average than those in 
work. At the same time, there tends to be a  smaller proportion of the unemployed with high 
earnings potential than in the case of those who are actually in employment and a larger 
proportion with relatively low earnings potential.
11 
3.  TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEMS 
The thirteen countries we consider represent very different welfare state regimes in Europe. 
As a background to the replacement rate results it is therefore useful to take a brief look at 
some of the main features of countries’ tax-benefit systems. Table 1 reports the importance of 
different instrument groups as a percentage of household disposable income and the amount 
of redistribution in the tax-benefit system as measured by the change in the Gini coefficient. 
In what follows we discuss these indicators in relation to an often-used typology of welfare 
states:  
                                                 
9 Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001) describe in more detail the assumptions underlying the simulation of 
unemployment benefits 
10 We thus assume that the selection bias is the same for all ‘out of work’ groups whereas it may be more 
conceptually appropriate to treat different ‘out of work’ groups such as involuntary unemployed differently from 
other out-of-work groups such as home-workers. However, for cross-country studies like the present one, the use 
of a single participation equation seems preferable to us on transparency grounds. 
11 Further details on the earnings equation as well as a comparison of predicted earnings and actual earnings is 
provided in Alphametrics and Microsimulation Unit (2002).   8
•  “Universal”: Denmark, (Netherlands);  
•  “Conservative”: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, (Netherlands);  
•  “Southern”: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain;  
•  “Liberal”: Ireland and the UK. 
Relative Size of Benefit Expenditures and Tax Revenues 
We see from table 1 that countries with Universal or Conservative welfare states tend to have 
benefits and benefits exceeding 30% of total disposable income with Liberal and Southern 
Welfare states with benefits expenditure less than 30% of disposable income. Italy is an 
exception due to relatively high public pensions and social assistance (mainly the social 
minimum components of public pensions). The Netherlands, on the other hand, has lower 
total benefits than other countries in the Universal or Conservative group. The importance of 
private provision for retirement pensions is a decisive factor here. The reliance on private 
pensions is particularly pronounced for Ireland and the UK resulting in low total benefit 
expenditures. 
Except in the case of Ireland, where means-tested social assistance benefits dominate, 
expenditures on contributory pensions (the main part of the “other benefit” category) are 
highest. While in a few countries such as Austria early retirement pensions are frequently 
substitutes for unemployment benefits, pensions will generally only have a limited impact 
upon working age replacement rates and will have no impact at all on NRRs computed for 
transitions out of work (RRab).  
Denmark and Belgium have the largest expenditure on social insurance unemployment 
benefits, followed by Germany, France and the Netherlands. The remaining countries have 
low unemployment benefit expenditure for a variety of reasons such as low unemployment, 
low benefit payments, low coverage or duration. Although unemployment insurance benefits 
in most countries are earnings related benefits, Ireland and the UK have flat rate benefits. 
Duration of receipt is also an issue. For example in the UK, unemployment benefits are 
payable only for at most 6 months. Durations are also short in the Southern countries. In many 
countries coverage of these benefits is limited to employees, with the self-employed excluded. 
This is also true for the Southern countries and Irleand where a higher proportion of self-
employed tends to reduce unemployment benefit coverage.  
Turning to the minimum income benefits heading, we the largest shares in Liberal countries. 
Ireland stands out in particular. Means-testing there is important because of a combination of 
factors such as the lack of earnings related benefits, coverage gaps and low durations of 
insurance benefits. After the short entitlement to unemployment benefits in the UK, 
unemployed individuals living in low-income household become eligible to Income Support. 
Income Support in the UK can also top up family incomes to the social minimum while in 
receipt of (flat amount) unemployment benefits. In most other countries, individuals 
exhausting their entitlement to social insurance unemployment benefits also become eligible 
for means tested unemployment (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) or social assistance 
benefits. The maximum durations of insurance benefit receipt as well as the profile of benefit 
amounts over time are however quite different across countries (see OECD, 2002). In Spain,   9
certain older workers and those with children may be eligible for unemployment assistance, 
but entitlement is generally quite limited. In Italy there is no entitlement once unemployment 
benefits are exhausted. Much of the social assistance payments in the Southern countries as 
well as in some other countries are also targeted at elderly people and so may be seen as a 
substitute for pensions rather than unemployment benefits. In some countries, another 
important determinant of income when out of work (or in low-paid jobs) are means tested 
housing benefits, especially in the UK, Denmark and France. As an expenditure group, they 
are not significant in other countries.  
In 7 countries out of 13, family benefits are the second most important expenditure group and 
are highest Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark and Austria. Because they are generally not 
income related, they serve to smooth income transitions into and out of work.
12 
On the revenue side, we classify three types of instruments: income taxes and social insurance 
contributions paid by employees (or benefit recipients) and employers. As a percentage of 
disposable incomes, in Belgian total taxes are clearly highest in Belgium and Denmark with 
Belgium (but not Denmark) also having the largest relative benefit expenditures. 
“Conservative” countries are all in the 50-60% range, the Southern countries mainly in the 40-
50% range and Greece, Spain and the UK around or below 30%. At around one fourth of 
disposable income the smalles tax share is found for Ireland. 
The structure of revenue raising instruments varies a great deal across countries. There is also 
little consistency within similar “welfare systems” groups. Income taxes in Ireland and the 
UK are large but social insurance contributions are very low. The highest income taxes are 
paid by Danes. Income taxation is also the most important instrument in Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Spain. Employer social insurance contributions are the most important 
(direct tax) revenue-raising instrument in four countries. As the income base for income taxes 
is wider, there may, for a given revenue raised, be less of an upwards pressure upon 
replacement rates than for social contributions. On the other hand, the more progressive the a 
tax, the larger will be its (upwards) influence on replacement rates.  
Different designs of income taxation are in use across countries. One aspect that matters in 
particular when analysing replacement rates is whether incomes are assessed separately for 
each individual or jointly. While most countries operate individual based tax systems, a 
number of countries tax couple (or family) income. (see O’Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999). 
These include, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Yet, even in 
countries where tax schedules are formally “individual” there can be sizable “joint” elements 
(e.g., due to tax free allowances that are transferable between spouses) so that the employment 
status and earnings of one spouse can have important implications for the tax liability of the 
other. 
Redistribution 
The degree of redistribution within a tax-benefit system depends not only on the size of the an 
instrument, but also on the degree of targeting or progressivity. In the second part of the table, 
we report the Gini measure of inequality for three different income definitions, gross market 
                                                 
12 In a number of countries, family benefits are, to varying degrees, income related (Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain).   10
income, including all market source of income, before employer contributions are deducted, 
gross total income (gross market income plus benefits), and disposable income (total income 
minus taxes). The difference between the Gini for gross market and gross total incomes 
corresponds to the redistribution (including any reranking) due to the benefit system in each 
country and the difference between gross and disposable incomes corresponds to the 
redistribution due to the tax and social insurance contribution systems.  
For pre tax-benefit (gross market) income we typically find Gini coefficients of between 50 
and 60%. Inequality of gross market incomes is lowest in Austria and the Netherlands. 
Although not exclusively so, the “Conservative” and Universal welfare states tend to have 
lower inequality of market incomes due to higher education levels, greater union power 
and/or other policies that promote equality in society. Ireland and the Southern Welfare states 
have amongst the highest inequality in market income. Belgium, despite having one of the 
lowest inequality levels in terms of disposable income has the highest inequality in market 
income. Clearly, the Belgian tax-benefit system is very redistributive. 
For all countries, we see that benefit systems reduce inequality by more than taxes. Tax-
benefit systems in Southern (Conservative) welfare states tend to be least (most) redistributive 
with Liberal welfare regimes coming between. Outside this general pattern, we find Austria 
and the Netherlands with relatively low redistribution and Spain with rather large changes in 
Gini coefficients. In the first two countries, inequality of market incomes is already low and 
so there is less a role for benefits. In Spain, the high pension related expenditures have a 
strong redistributive effect. 
4.  RESULTS 
Distribution of Net Replacement Rates 
Table 2 presents, for the 13 countries, average NRRs as well as the proportion of people with 
replacement rates of less than 40%, 40-80% and 80% or higher for each of the three types of 
transition. The top section shows the distribution of replacement rates for those currently in 
work (RRab). The countries with the highest replacement rates (of over 80% on average) are 
primarily either those with Conservative welfare states (Austria, France and the Benelux 
countries) or Universal welfare states (Denmark). With an average of less than 70% and a 
minimum of 57% the lowest in-work NNRs are found in Southern welfare states and the UK. 
Germany, Ireland and Spain come in-between with average replacement rates in the 70-80% 
range.  
Turning to the second part of table 2 and to those who are currently unemployed (RRba), we 
find a different distribution of replacement rates. There is less variability across countries than 
for in-work NRRs (RRab). In particular we notice that Portugal, and to a lesser extent Greece 
and Italy, now has substantially higher replacement rates. The opposite is true for Belgium 
and, particularly, the Netherlands. 
The third type of replacement rates we examine concerns those who are currently “inactive” 
(RRca, bottom part of table 2). Again, we compare net household incomes in the current (out 
of work) situation with net household incomes that would result if the inactive individual 
were to move into work. Italy moves from having the lowest average replacement rate to 
having one of the highest average replacement rates. Replacement rates are also higher for   11
Austria where relatively large numbers of people in early retired and generous disability 
benefits play a role. Average replacement rates are also higher for Greece but much lower 
than for the in work group for the Benelux countries, Denmark, France and Germany. 
The role of taxes, benefits and other household incomes 
To enable us to interpret these results and related them to relevant tax-benefit characteristics, 
it is useful to break down the various influences. To do this, we now try to explain the 
difference in the distribution of NRRs rates with reference to the income sources that 
contribute to them. We disaggregate total out of work income (i.e., the numerator of the NRR) 
utilising the decomposition elaborated in Immervoll and O’Donoghue (forthcoming (b)): 
  100 ×
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RR  (1) 
where  Benefit ∆  is the change in benefits when moving out of work,  IW Benefit  is the benefits 
received by the household when the individual is in work (this includes, but is not limited to, 
employment conditional or “in-work” benefits),  Tax ∆  is the change in taxes and 
contributions when moving from out of work,  IW Tax is the sum of taxes and contributions 
paid by the household when the individual is in work and  IW  Income Disposable  is household 
disposable income when the individual is in work. Other Household Income is the sum of all 
other household incomes (which is the same in the in work and out of work situations). 
In tables 3 (a-c) we report respectively the decomposition of NRRs by income source for the 
in-work sample (RRab), for the unemployed sample (RRba) and the “inactive” sample (RRca). 
For convenience, each component is written as a percentage of the average replacement rate 
for the group. 
Characteristics of Individuals with High Replacement Rates 
As a final analytical step we now consider the types of characteristics that influence the 
distribution of replacement rates considering the in work NRR (RRab)
13 and the unemployed 
samples (RRba) only. Because of the number of countries and dimensions involved, we use a 
regression model, regressing individual replacement rates on characteristics in an attempt to 
describe how replacement rates vary across different types of individuals and households. The 
“explanatory” variables and estimated coefficients are reported in table 4. A regression along 
these lines can be somewhat heroic (as indicated by very low R2 for some countries, 
particularly Denmark and the Netherlands). But as a descriptive tool it allows us to 
conveniently compare across countries. In addition, the estimated coefficients capture any 
interactions between different characteristics which would not be obvious from simple cross 
tabulations. 
5.  DISCUSSION 
Which characteristics are associated with the various replacement rate levels? We see from 
table 4 that women's replacement rates are higher than men's in all countries. There are a 
                                                 
13 For comparability purposes we include only those who are in full-time work.   12
number of reasons for these differentials. Firstly, it is important to note that they are not due 
to more generous benefit regimes for women. Rather, women are likely to have lower 
earnings, both in terms of their hourly wage rates and because of shorter working hours, 
increasing replacement rates. In addition, and as we shall see below, household composition 
plays an important role, with working women having a high probability of living with 
partners who have higher earnings. If the husband’s earnings are the main source of 
household income then income will, in relative terms, not fall by very much if the woman 
loses her job. The (household based) replacement rate she is facing will therefore be relatively 
high – with possible implications for work incentives. 
Young people tend to have higher replacement rates for similar reasons. Firstly, younger 
people will have lower (actual and potential) in-work earnings than older people and thus 
have higher replacement rates as unemployment benefits typically provide minimum 
payments (“floors”) that younger people are more likely to benefit from. Secondly, they are 
more likely to live at home with other earners. The importance of household structure is also 
confirmed by the positive coefficients for household size (which increases the likelihood of 
other earnings in the household) and negative coefficients for the number of children (which 
do not provide additional earnings).  
The “unemployment rate” variable represents the out of work rate (by gender five year age 
band). Although in general it has a positive sign, it may be capturing the fact that younger 
people and women have both higher replacement rates and out of work rates. 
Comparing results for the different transitions 
In most countries, fewer unemployed have high replacement rates (≥ 80%). There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly in-work replacement rates (RRab) measure the replacement 
rate in the first year of unemployment assuming that people are in fact entitled to 
unemployment insurance benefits. As the duration of entitlement to unemployment benefits 
(UB) is normally limited, those who are currently out of work and have been unemployed for 
longer may cease to be eligible for these benefits. They may then become eligible for lower 
valued unemployment- or social assistance benefits or nothing as in the case of many 
unemployed in Southern European countries. In Denmark, where membership in the 
unemployment insurance scheme is voluntary, those who are observed to be unemployed in 
the data and are not members of the insurance scheme will not be receiving any 
unemployment benefits at all (in cases where family income is “low”, they would receive 
social assistance instead). Secondly, UB may fall in value over time as in the case of France. 
Consequently, even for those in the RRba sample who are still in receipt of UB, benefit levels 
may be lower than those received immediately after becoming unemployed (as in the 
calculation of RRab). In the UK and Ireland, benefits become means tested after a period of 
time and may thus also fall in value. In short, because the duration of unemployment will 
often be higher for the unemployed sample (RRba) than those who are “made” unemployed in 
our simulations (RRab), institutional factors such as duration dependent eligibility and benefit 
amounts will result in lower replacement rates for the sample of unemployed compared with 
the sample of working individuals. 
On the other hand, the earnings we predict for those moving into work (RRba) will be an 
important factor. Potential earnings of the unemployed going into work will often be lower 
than earnings of those currently in work. The unemployed will typically have lower education   13
levels and/or frequently be younger on average than the population in work. These factors 
influencing potential earnings will be picked up by our earnings model. Compared to 
observed earnings, predicted entry wages for the currently unemployed will on average be 
lower. This will result in a lower denominator and thus higher NRRs. 
The two effects therefore run in opposite directions, with the “earnings” effect being 
relatively stronger in Greece, Italy and Portugal and the “institutional factors” dominating in 
most other countries where welfare provision is generally better (both in terms of coverage 
and benefit amounts) and so has more of an impact. For the “inactive” group (RRca), results 
depend strongly on the composition of this groups which is very heterogeneous across 
countries. It will include early retirement pensioners (who may receive relatively generous 
benefits and will thus have high NRRs such as in Austria and Italy) as well as home-workers 
or discouraged workers who withdrew from the labour force and do not receive any benefit 
(and whose NRRs can therefore be quite low as in Belgium or Germany). Invalidity benefits 
will play a similar role as early retirement pensions and may combine with the “earnings” 
effect and with family support to produce larger numbers of individuals facing high NRRs 
than are found for the other types of transition (Greece, Italy). 
Low Replacement Rates 
When considering issues related to work disincentives, one is often particularly interested in 
high replacement rates. However, we notice at least 10% of the in-work population (RRab) 
with replacement rates of less than 40% for the Southern and Liberal welfare state countries. 
Indeed, more than 20% of Greek and Italian workers fall into this group. There is a similar if 
less extreme picture for RRba (those who are currently unemployed) and RRca (those who are 
currently “inactive”) groups. 
Considering firstly those with replacement rates below 40% in table 3, we notice that the 
contribution of marginal benefits (the extra benefit the household receives when the 
individual moves out of work) to NRRs is very low compared to other factors. In particular, 
the lower taxes paid when out of work as opposed to in work are much more important. They 
almost entirely offset in-work taxes showing that these people live in very low income 
household where, if they lose their job, almost no taxes are paid at all. In some of the 
countries with large numbers of low RRab, marginal benefits are particulary low which points 
to the lack of in-work income insurance as a main cause of insuffient resources when out of 
work. 
Benefits in work may be universal benefits (such as family benefits), means-tested benefits in 
households (“working poor”) or unemployment benefits paid to other individuals in the 
household who are out of work. In countries operating in-work benefits (in 1998 Ireland and 
the UK) they will also include benefits that are conditional upon employment and are thus 
only paid when in work. The Benefits in work component is typically the highest in the 
Southern countries. One of the reasons for this is that household sizes in Southern countries 
are typically larger than other countries containing elderly relatives in receipt of pensions for 
example, many with a single main breadwinner. If this breadwinner loses his or her job, then 
low other incomes and benefits together with low replacement benefits results in low RRs. 
This is confirmed by relatively high poverty rates and gaps in these countries, when the main 
breadwinner in a family loses their job.   14
The remaining component of the replacement rate is the influence of other household income, 
either non-employment income of the individual who makes the transition or any type of 
market income of other individuals living in the same household. In Greece, Italy and 
Portugal, other incomes are on average the most important compared with other countries.  
For some groups in other countries, these incomes are important, but typically there are very 
few people in non-southern European countries with NRRs this low. 
Medium and High Replacement Rates 
We now consider together the groups of individuals with replacement rates of 40-80% and 
80+%. Comparing with the low NRR group, we see that as NRRs are rising, the share of 
marginal benefits is falling. However, this does not mean that benefits are less relevant for 
higher replacement rates. Indeed, for the 40-80% NRR group we see that, because the 
contribution of other components is falling as well, that marginal benefits are very important. 
Yet, for the >80% group we clearly see the importance of marginal benefits drop far below 
that of other household incomes. Even though other household income was the most 
important for the low replacement rate group, this income component increases in importance 
as one ascends the RR distribution, resulting in the conclusion that the existence of other 
income, mainly the income of spouses and parents act as the most important income source in 
maintaining living standards when out of work. 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have used the EUROMOD tax-benefit model to derive distributions of 
replacement rates in 13 EU countries and to decompose the effect of different income sources 
on the distribution of net replacement rates. 
We noticed that patterns of incomes of different types of individuals (currently in work, 
unemployed or inactive) with high replacement rates were very different. This highlights the 
importance of using micro-based simulation methods when trying to measure replacement 
rates or when quantifying the elasticity of labour supply resulting from these replacement 
rates. Averages will not suffice particularly when one is concerned, as is often the case, with 
the more “unusual” cases at the fringes of the labour market. 
Using the tax-benefit model, we are able to isolate the influence of social and fiscal policy 
factors and other incomes that determine the level of out of work income versus income when 
in work. In general the tax-benefit system is not in fact the main "preserver" of household 
income. The presence of income from parents, spouses or other individuals in the household 
is likely to have a stronger impact on income maintenance and thus on the existence of high 
replacement rates than tax–benefit instruments. Because of this, replacement rates may not 
necessarily be the best indicator of the isolated impact of taxes and benefits on income 
replacement. They are essential, however, for understanding the context in which employment 
transitions take place. While it is desirable to break down replacement rates to separately 
show the factors that drive them, it would be misleading to focus on any one of those factors 
in isolation. For instance, marginal effective tax rates computed for transitions into work
14 can 
show very clearly the effective gain from employment. But since they do not relate this to the 
                                                 
14 This measure has also been called “Average Effective Tax Rate” (OECD, 2002), “Participation Tax Rate” 
(Immervoll et al, 2003) or “Tax-Benefit to Earnings Ratio” (Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2001b).   15
original level of household resources, it is not clear what financial difference a transition into 
work would make to the household as a whole. 
Future work in this area could attempt to address some of the asymmetries that exist between 
the simulation of the various transitions. For transitions out of work, for instance, it would be 
desirable not to restrict the reference time period to one year. Instead one could utilise 
empirical distributions of unemployment durations (as measured in Labour Force Surveys) 
and assume that expected unemployment durations are distributed the same way. This would 
permit a more realistic weighting of the various benefit levels available during a period of 
unemployment and may thus better capture the true financial trade-off people are facing when 
making labour supply choices. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
Table 1. Characteristics of Tax-Benefit Systems: 1998 
Country  AT BE DK FR GE GR IR  IT LU NL PT  SP UK 
As a % of Disposable Income               
Benefits               
Unemployment Benefits (1)  1.2  4.1  7.9  2.3 2.7 0.2 1.2 0.4 0.3 2.5 1.5 1.5 0.2 
Means Tested Minimum Income Benefits (2)  1.5  2.4 1.0 1.1 2.3 1.8 11.4  4.0 0.6 2.2 0.7 3.1 5.5 
Means Tested Housing Benefits (3)  0.2  0.0  1.6 1.5 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 2.8 
Family Benefits (4)  3.2  4.5  3.4  2.7  2.9 0.7 2.4 1.3 4.7 1.8 1.6 0.6 1.9 
Other Benefits incl. Pensions (5)  31.0  28.0  19.3 25.5 23.1 19.6 6.3  25.0 26.0 18.1 19.2 22.3 11.0 
Total Benefits (6)  37.2  38.9  33.2  33.1  31.9 22.4 21.4 30.7 31.7 25.3 23.0 27.6 21.4 
Taxes               
Employer  SICs  (7)  20.7 35.7 3.2  28.2 17.2 6.3  3.0  18.0 10.3 15.3 19.6 13.1 6.3 
Income  Tax  (8)  17.9 25.8 51.5 11.0 20.6 12.2 17.6 23.2 17.5 15.8 15.3 15.4 20.0 
Employee  SICs  (9)  16.7 11.0 13.6 19.7 17.2 9.9  3.8  8.3  10.2 24.3 10.6 5.2  5.5 
Total  Taxes  (10)  55.3 72.5 68.3 58.9 55.1 28.4 24.4 49.5 38.0 55.4 45.4 33.7 31.9 
Redistribution (Gini)                                        
Gross Market Income [Market Income plus (7)]  49.4 59.5 52.9 54.5 53.7 55.6 57.4 54.2 53.2 45.9 58.2 57.7 53.9 
Gross Income [Gross Market Income plus (6)]  32.8  33.0 33.5 32.9 33.9 40.2 39.2 37.9 33.4 31.1 43.0 37.7 36.3 
Disposable Income [Gross Income less (10)]  26.6  25.7 25.7 28.3 26.3 36.7 33.1 33.9 26.5 26.4 38.2 33.1 31.8 
Source: EUROMOD. Benefit and tax totals are shown in relation to total cash household disposable income before housing costs and other forms of “committed expenditures”. 
Gini coefficients relate to per-capita incomes and counting each individual; any negative income values enter as zero values. The equivalence scale used for deriving per-capita 
values is of the “modified OECD” type (with weights 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for further adults and 0.3 for children aged under 14).   18
Table 2. Distribution of Net Replacement Rates: 1998 
 At  Be  Dk  Fr  Ge  Gr  Ir  It  Lu  Nl  Pt  Sp  UK 
RRab – In work to Unemployment Transition               
<  40  3 3 2 0 6  25  12  24  2 2  13  12  15 
40-  80  35 40 40 15 56 51 44 60 26 32 65 32 59 
80+  61 56 58 84 39 25 44 16 73 65 22 56 25 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average Replacement Rate  81  79 81 87 71 58 72 57 84 83 68 74 63 
               
RRba –Unemployment to In Work Transition                
<  40  2  7  7  5 12  14 5 16 9 12 7 12  13 
40-  80  38 56 42 35 50 52 54 60 31 47 45 41 63 
80+  61 38 51 59 39 34 40 24 60 41 48 47 24 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average Replacement Rate  84  73 81 84 71 66 72 63 87 71 84 77 64 
               
RRca –Inactive to In Work Transition                
<  40  1  14  7 7  12  7 3 5 2 8  14  11  8 
40-  80  40 58 60 58 58 50 61 39 47 54 59 51 67 
80+  58 28 33 35 30 43 36 56 51 38 27 39 25 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average Replacement Rate  91  68 70 72 67 75 73 84 81 72 65 71 67 
Source: EUROMOD.  
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Table 3(a) Out of Work Components of Replacement Income as Percentage of In-work 
Income (RRab – In work to Unemployment Transition): 1998 
RRab   Decomposition  At Be Dk Fr Ge Gr Ir  It Lu Nl Pt Sp UK
<  40  Marginal  Benefit  58 78 52 145 51 21 66 31 96 74 33 68 44
  Benefits in work  14  9 7 5 16 28 13 19 5  13  17  18 8
  Marginal  Tax  343 306 421 278 148 206 115 176 202 358 149 167 117
  In-Work  Tax  -350 -333 -469 -349 -155 -217 -118 -197 -229 -388 -169 -187 -132
  Other  Household  Income  35 40 90 21 40 62 24 71 25 44 70 33 63
  Average  RR  22 27 25 31 29 15 25 22 26 23 28 19 27
                 
40-  80  Marginal  Benefit  39 49 62 95 42 23 31 11 67  100 14 56 19
  Benefits in work  14  16 12 5 13 11 17 22 11  8  17  9 8
  Marginal  Tax  50 54 66 38 66 25 30 30 29 30 36 21 27
  In-Work  Tax  -69 -76 -118 -60 -83 -45 -40 -61 -58 -64 -62 -38 -50
  Other  Household  Income  66 58 79 22 61 85 62 98 51 26 96 52 97
  Average  RR  67 66 66 74 64 63 62 63 69 72 57 64 60
         
80+  Marginal  Benefit  27 26 44 39 18 20 14 3 42 41  7 30 11
  Benefits  in  work  20 19 14 12 12 17 11 22 17 10 19 15 10
  M a r g i n a l   T a x   1 3   1 3 1 4 1 5 2 09684  8  7  44
  In-Work  Tax  -39 -42 -80 -38 -56 -28 -24 -47 -27 -48 -36 -21 -31
  Other  Household  Income  80 84 108 71 106 81 93 114 64 89  103 71 106
  Average  RR  92 91 91 89 89 88 92 87 90 90 83 91 89
Source: EUROMOD 
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Table 3(b) Out of Work Components of Replacement Income as Percentage of In-work 
Income (RRba –Unemployment to In Work Transition): 1998 
RRba  Decomposition  At Be Dk Fr Ge Gr Ir  It Lu Nl Pt Sp UK
<  40  Marginal  Benefit  20 62 62 66 66 10 81 -4 56 56 13 40 60
  Benefits  in  work  0 18 22 13 15 27 18 56 8 13 29 30 8
  Marginal  Tax  149 235 274 159 239 113 124 141 85 272 134 101 120
  In-Work  Tax  -179 -252 -309 -171 -245 -125 -124 -160 -100 -301 -143 -108 -131
  Other  Household  Income 110 36 50 33 25 75 1 66 52 60 68 37 43
  Average  RR  33 31 29 28 30 22 28 24 36 25 25 27 29
         
40-  80  Marginal  Benefit  12 32 40 37 38 1 36 4 39 24 12 18 28
  Benefits  in  work  19 20 36 17 19 19 33 33 33 12 18 28 15
  Marginal  Tax  35 57 60 37 67 14 21 23 19 46 23 17 29
  In-Work  Tax  -59 -79 -111 -55 -86 -31 -25 -53 -31 -83 -38 -31 -47
  Other  Household  Income  93 70 75 63 62 97 35 93 41  101 86 68 76
  Average  RR  67 61 65 62 63 65 64 63 66 62 64 62 62
         
80+  Marginal  Benefit  12 36 40 31 34 0 17 8 39 30 52 19 21
  Benefits in work  16  20 26 21 14 13 28 25 21  15  9  21 15
  M a r g i n a l   T a x   8  868 2 43540  5  4  28
  In-Work  Tax  -38 -36 -70 -29 -50 -24 -17 -41 -16 -48 -19 -18 -33
  Other  Household  Income 102 72 97 69 78 107 66 104 56 97 54 76 88
  Average  RR  93 96 97 98 93 88 89 91 99 92  115 96 87
Source: EUROMOD   21
Table 3(c) Out of Work Components of Replacement Income as Percentage of In-work 
Income (RRca –Inactive to In Work Transition): 1998 
RRca  Decomposition  At Be Dk Fr Ge Gr Ir  It Lu Nl Pt Sp UK
<  40  Marginal  Benefit  11 32 9 17 61 11 61 15 17 23 20 10 48
  Benefits  in  work  29 30 62 19 19 34 18 34 28 25 23 30 13
  Marginal  Tax  116 240 267 107 226 96 80 128 123 250 115 118 115
  In-Work  Tax  -135 -251 -303 -130 -231 -113 -81 -166 -133 -281 -137 -130 -128
  Other  Household  Income  78 49 66 88 25 71 22 88 65 84 79 72 51
  Average  RR  33 29 25 31 28 25 31 25 32 28 26 24 29
         
40-  80  Marginal  Benefit  6 15 20 6 14 3 13 14 6 12  6  4 21
  Benefits  in  work  23 29 46 20 20 16 23 25 23 17 18 21 15
  Marginal  Tax  22 51 58 28 53 13 17 22 23 46 27 17 25
  In-Work  Tax  -57 -77 -100 -57 -84 -32 -28 -51 -41 -84 -57 -33 -46
  Other  Household  Income  106  82 78 103 97 100 75 90 89 110 106  92 85
  Average  RR  67 63 66 64 64 66 67 67 67 62 56 63 63
         
80+  Marginal  Benefit  23 25 8 9 14 8 5 22 14 16 21  6 24
  Benefits  in  work  27 22 40 17 16 11 11 22 19 14 11 15 19
  M a r g i n a l   T a x   2   1 1 1 69 1 83735  7  3  49
  In-Work  Tax  -38 -53 -79 -40 -54 -29 -28 -38 -30 -54 -34 -26 -31
  Other  Household  Income  87 93 115 106 106 107 105 91 92  116 99  102 79
  Average  RR  98 93 88 90 88 91 87 98 90 90 93 91 88
Source: EUROMOD 
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Table 4 Characteristics that Influence Replacement Rates 
Country  At  Be  Dk  Fr  Gr  Ir   
  Coef p Coef p Coef p Coef p Coef p Coef. p 
In-Work  Sample  -0.059 0.00 0.064 0.00 -0.061 0.26 0.099 0.00 0.049 0.08 -0.015 0.03 
Male  -0.052 0.00 -0.053 0.00 -0.121 0.01 -0.036 0.00 -0.079 0.02 -0.063 0.00 
Aged <= 25  0.030  0.02  0.127  0.00  -0.034 0.52  0.023 0.00  0.021 0.54  0.079 0.00 
Unemp.  Rate  0.143 0.00 0.077 0.10 0.133 0.72 -0.001 0.94 0.203 0.01  0.229 0.00 
Married  0.014 0.17 0.020 0.15 -0.068 0.15 -0.013 0.00 -0.098 0.00  0.018 0.03 
Cohabiting  0.005 0.77 0.078 0.00 -0.039 0.42 -0.002 0.66 -0.004 0.96   0.00 
# Ch. Aged 0-5  -0.039  0.00  -0.001  0.94  -0.029 0.42  -0.015 0.00  -0.040 0.04  -0.037 0.00 
# Ch. Aged 6-10  -0.032  0.00  -0.009  0.40  -0.035 0.38  -0.018 0.00  -0.046 0.01  -0.040 0.00 
#Ch.  Aged  11-17  -0.050 0.00 -0.018 0.08 -0.026 0.51 -0.021 0.00 -0.045 0.00 -0.044 0.00 
No.  Pers.  in  HH 0.063 0.00 0.033 0.00 0.039 0.15 0.033 0.00 0.064 0.00  0.053 0.00 
Home  Owner  0.020 0.18 -0.023 0.15 -0.167 0.10 -0.014 0.62 -0.043 0.19  0.011 0.48 
Home Owner 
(with Mortgage) 
0.008 0.60 -0.024 0.08 -0.154 0.00 0.010 0.00 -0.017 0.68 
-0.016 0.28 
Social  Renter  0.033 0.02 0.002 0.92 -0.114 0.05 0.005 0.18 0.034 0.72 -0.029 0.07 
Housing  Costs  0.000 0.06 0.000 0.19 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.60  0.000 0.10 
Constant  0.538 0.00 0.609 0.00 1.109 0.00 0.700 0.00 0.441 0.00  0.488 0.00 
No.  Observations  2257  1430  1738  8022  3178   2458 
R2  0.219  0.113  0.024  0.165  0.072   0.391 
 
Country  It     Lu     Nl     Pt     Sp     UK    
  Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
In-Work  Sample 0.032 0.00 0.139 0.00 0.080 0.00 -0.075 0.00 0.066 0.00 0.009 0.54 
Male  -0.158 0.00 -0.041 0.00 -0.076 0.00 -0.084 0.00 -0.093 0.00 -0.119 0.00 
Aged <= 25  0.072  0.00 -0.028  0.00 0.040 0.00 0.029 0.02 0.063 0.00 0.096  0.00 
Unemp.  Rate  -0.063 0.00 -0.033 0.07 -0.100 0.02 0.050 0.20 0.104 0.00 0.060 0.18 
Married  -0.053 0.00 -0.009 0.16 0.010 0.36 -0.017 0.10 -0.049 0.00 0.031 0.01 
Cohabiting  -0.020 0.56 0.026 0.00 0.030 0.02 -0.009 0.73 -0.011 0.66 0.044 0.00 
# Ch. Aged 0-5  -0.066  0.00 0.007  0.17 -0.029 0.00 -0.010 0.22 -0.025 0.00 -0.061  0.00 
# Ch. Aged 6-10  -0.076  0.00 -0.022  0.00 -0.059 0.00 0.004 0.62 -0.044 0.00 -0.057  0.00 
#Ch.  Aged  11-17  -0.073 0.00 -0.011 0.06 -0.050 0.00 -0.018 0.01 -0.052 0.00 -0.059 0.00 
No. Pers. in HH  0.064  0.00 0.041  0.00 0.037 0.00 0.050 0.00 0.037 0.00 0.083  0.00 
Home  Owner  0.032 0.16 -0.029 0.00 0.014 0.54 -0.004 0.68 -0.041 0.00 -0.035 0.08 
Home Owner 
(with  Mortgage) 0.036 0.13 -0.032 0.00 0.013 0.32 -0.001 0.96 0.015 0.24 -0.044 0.00 
Social  Renter  0.035 0.00 -0.020 0.67 0.043 0.00 0.000 0.99 0.027 0.34 0.042 0.02 
Housing  Costs  0.000 0.16 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.27 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.36 
Constant  0.469 0.00 0.668 0.00 0.680 0.00 0.604 0.00 0.633 0.00 0.456 0.00 
No. Observations  6194   2013   2611  2809  4884  5077  
R2  0.293   0.240   0.080 0.171 0.137 0.104   
Source: EUROMOD 
Note: the “in-work sample” variable is a dummy whose value is one for people currently in work (individuals included in the 
RRab sample) and zero otherwise (i.e., for those included in the RRba sample).   23
Table A.1. Data Sources 
Country  Base Dataset for EUROMOD  Date of collection Reference time 
period for incomes
Austria 
European Community Household Panel, 
Austrian version  1999 annual 1998
Belgium  Panel Survey on Belgian Households (W6)  1997 annual 1996
Denmark  European Community Household Panel (W2)   1995 annual 1994
Finland  Income distribution survey   1997 annual 1996
France  Budget de Famille  1994/5 annual 1993/4
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel (W15) 1998 annual  1997
Greece European  Community  Household Panel (W3)  1996 annual 1995
Ireland  Living in Ireland Survey (W1)  1994 month in 1994
Italy  Survey of Households Income and Wealth   1996 annual 1995
Luxembourg PSELL-2 (W5)  1999 annual 1998
Netherlands Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek (W3)  1996 annual 1995
Portugal European  Community  Household Panel (W3)  1996 annual 1995
Spain European  Community  Household Panel (W3)  1996 annual 1995
UK  Family Expenditure Survey   1995/6 month in 1995/6
 
Table A.2. Sample Sizes (individuals) 
  At Be Dk Fr Ge Gr Ir  It Lu Nl Pt Sp  UK 
RRA – In work to Unemployment Transition               
<  40  86 58 50 17  466  864  407  1440  42 76  259  577  932 
40-  80  950  754  800  1342 4636 1760 1518 3651  622  1201 1280 1539 3625 
80+  1647  1052  1151  7399  3210 854 1495 967 1767  2420 445 2706  1544 
Total  2684 1863 2001 8759 8312 3479 3420 6058 2431 3697 1984 4822 6101 
               
RRB –Unemployment to In Work Transition                 
<  40  5  24  38  70 151  104 51 263  5  113  7  173 76 
40-  80  108 204 234 474 645 395 517 992  18  442  44  580 366 
80+  174 138 287 793 503 261 383 398  36  378  47  676 140 
Total  288 367 559  1337  1299  761 951  1653 59  933  98 1429  582 
               
RRC –Inactive to In Work Transition                 
<  40  13  75  16 258  191  174 63 245 16  56 134  369  173 
40-  80  354  317  139 2139 890 1331  1270  1826 445  374  572 1748  1413 
80+  508  153  76  1294 461 1156 746 2629 488  263  256 1344 534 
Total  875 545 231  3692  1542  2661  2079  4700  948 693 962  3461  2120 
Source: EUROMOD.   24
Table A.3. Earnings Model 
Male AT BE DK FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PT SP UK
Coeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. DevCoeff Std. Dev
Earnings Equation
Years In Education yrsed m 0.0561 0.0065 0.0596 0.0061 0.0355 0.0086 0.0747 0.0024 0.0273 0.0019 0.0503 0.0081 0.0181 0.0057 0.0501 0.0035 0.0616 0.0065 0.0497 0.0043 0.0621 0.007 0.0562 0.0055 0.0405 0.0041
Years of Experience tm 0.0316 0.0041 0.0372 0.0054 0.0499 0.0069 0.0347 0.0046 0.0371 0.003 0.0272 0.0119 0.0471 0.004 0.0265 0.0031 0.0444 0.0089 0.0583 0.0038 0.0028 0.0092 0.0494 0.0082 0.0436 0.004
Years of Experience^2 t2 m -3E-04 9E-05 -2E-04 0.0001 -8E-04 0.0002 -2E-04 1E-04 -3E-04 6E-05 -2E-04 0.0002 -7E-04 8E-05 -2E-04 6E-05 -5E-04 0.0002 -7E-04 9E-05 0.0002 0.0002 -5E-04 0.0002 -7E-04 9E-05
Region 1 reg1 m 000000 0 . 1 0 9 8 0 . 1 3 9 1 0 . 0 7 7 8 0 . 0428 0.0435 0.048 0.1559 0.024 0 0 -0.037 0.0323 0 0 -0.021 0.0437 -0.046 0.0658 0.1482 0.0776
Region 2 reg2 m -0.061 0.0253 0.023 0.0279 0 0 -0.003 0.1456 0.1066 0.0565 0.1144 0.0508 0.1251 0.023 000000 0 . 0 1 3 8 0 . 0 4 3 9 0 . 1 3 6 6 0 . 0 6 2 8 0 . 0 6 7 4 0 . 0 7 3 5
Region 3 reg3 m -0.016 0.0259 -0.025 0.0424 0 0 -0.074 0.1444 0.1179 0.0341 0.1729 0.047 0 0 0.0684 0.04050000 0 . 2 8 6 9 0 . 0 5 0 5 0 . 1 9 6 3 0 . 0 6 7 5 0 . 0 9 6 9 0 . 0 7 2 6
Region 4 reg4 m 000000 - 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 1 4 3 2 0 . 1 3 1 6 0 . 0 6 6 50000 0 . 0752 0.06280000 0 . 0 8 9 9 0 . 0 5 0 8 0 . 0 0 6 1 0 . 0 6 4 0 . 0 5 9 9 0 . 0 7 4 6
Region 5 reg5 m 000000 - 0 . 0 9 6 0 . 1 4 3 9 0 . 1 3 3 7 0 . 0 3 3 30000 0 . 0186 0.04650000 0 . 0 3 6 7 0 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 6 2 8 0 . 0 6 0 9 0 . 0 8 7 0 . 0 7 3 3
Region 6 reg6 m 000000 - 0 . 1 0 2 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 1 5 6 5 0 . 0 3 7 50000 0 . 0412 0.05330000 0 . 0 6 2 7 0 . 0 4 5 - 0 . 1 7 0 . 0 6 2 3 0 . 0 7 6 5 0 . 0 7 9 4
Region 7 reg7 m 000000 - 0 . 1 0 4 0 . 1 4 5 7 0 . 1 0 6 1 0 . 0 3 8 30000 - 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 5 1 100000000 0 . 3 4 2 8 0 . 0 7 3 3
Region 8 reg8 m 000000 - 0 . 1 6 5 0 . 1 4 1 3 0 . 1 6 4 7 0 . 0 3 5 60000 0 . 0723 0.042900000000 0 . 2 0 4 2 0 . 0 7 0 7
Region 9 reg9 m 000000 - 0 . 0 5 3 0 . 1 4 2 3 0 . 1 2 2 8 0 . 0 3 5 70000 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 4 5 300000000 0 . 0 7 9 8 0 . 0 7 3 3
Region 10 reg10 m 000000 0 . 0 3 1 2 0 . 1 4 2 9000000 - 0 . 1 0 9 0 . 0 5 7 400000000 0 . 0 6 4 7 0 . 0 7 9 6
Region 11 reg11 m 000000 - 0 . 1 3 8 0 . 1 4 7 - 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 0 4 5 40000 - 0 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 5 2 500000000 0 . 0 8 1 9 0 . 0 7 4 2
Region 12 reg12 m 000000 - 0 . 1 1 7 0 . 1 4 1 6 - 0 . 2 0 3 0 . 0 3 6 90000 - 0 . 0 5 8 0 . 0 4 7 80000000000
Region 13 reg13 m 000000 - 0 . 2 1 4 0 . 1 4 2 5 - 0 . 2 6 2 0 . 0 3 5 30000 - 0 . 1 2 5 0 . 0 5 6 20000000000
Region 14 reg14 m 000000 - 0 . 1 0 8 0 . 1 4 5 5 - 0 . 2 8 8 0 . 0 3 6 10000 0 . 0146 0.09960000000000
Region 15 reg15 m 000000 - 0 . 1 5 9 0 . 1 4 2 3 - 0 . 2 4 2 0 . 0 3 5 60000 - 0 . 2 6 9 0 . 0 4 3 40000000000
Region 16 reg16 m 000000 - 0 . 0 8 4 0 . 1 4 2 7 - 0 . 2 0 . 0 3 4 30000 - 0 . 2 3 4 0 . 0 4 5 10000000000
Region 17 reg17 m 000000 - 0 . 1 6 2 0 . 1 5 3 4000000 - 0 . 0 7 4 0 . 0 8 1 50000000000
Region 18 reg18 m 000000 - 0 . 1 1 2 0 . 1 4 0 2000000 - 0 . 3 0 1 0 . 0 6 0 90000000000
Region 19 reg19 m 000000 - 0 . 1 1 9 0 . 1 4 7 8000000 - 0 . 3 4 3 0 . 0 4 6 60000000000
Region 20 reg20 m 000000 - 0 . 1 7 4 0 . 1 4 4 1000000 - 0 . 2 6 3 0 . 0 5 4 90000000000
Region 21 reg21 m 000000 0 . 0 0 4 1 0 . 1 4 1000000000000000000
Region 22 reg22 m 00000000000000000000000000
Armed forces occ0 m 00000000000000000000 0 . 6 3 1 4 0 . 0 6 7 800 0 . 4 2 4 9 0 . 0 8 4 6
Senior officials/managers occ1 m 0.4874 0.0492 0 0 0.3511 0.0735 0 0 0.7338 0.019 0.1849 0.0762 0.5331 0.0457 0.6486 0.0591 0.5994 0.0626 -0.077 0.0335 0.9336 0.0904 0.665 0.0863 0.388 0.024
Professionals occ2 m 0.4905 0.0644 0 0 0.3052 0.0657 0 0 0.9564 0.0339 0.3052 0.067 0.7109 0.0401 0 0 0.6728 0.0624 -0.179 0.0253 1.1217 0.0825 0.7565 0.0638 0.4168 0.0329
Technicians occ3 m 0.3559 0.0393 0 0 0.2901 0.0629 0 0 0.582 0.0218 0.3241 0.0699 0.4054 0.0408 0.5319 0.0357 0.4451 0.0542 0 0 0.7601 0.0558 0.5412 0.0566 0 0
Clerks occ4 m 0.2361 0.0445 0 0 0.1891 0.0717 0 0 0.4843 0.0256 0.2676 0.0593 0.2299 0.0433 0.2742 0.0235 0.2458 0.0589 -0.021 0.0234 0.4909 0.0541 0.5741 0.057 0 0
Service and sales workers occ5 m 0.1581 0.0439 0 0 0.0578 0.072 0 0 0.3702 0.0229 0.144 0.059 0.0818 0.0366 0 0 0.001 0.0652 0 0 0.3018 0.0491 0.2766 0.048 0.0802 0.0269
Skilled agricultural occ6 m -0.232 0.0637 0 0 -0.018 0.1093 0 0 0.1776 0.0435 -0.599 0.0947 -0.104 0.0758 0 0 -0.258 0.0982 0 0 -0.344 0.0643 0.0997 0.0898 -0.328 0.0664
Craft and trades workers occ7 m 0.1833 0.0354 0 0 0.2014 0.0562 0 0 0.4214 0.0128 0.0956 0.0487 0.1901 0.0316 -1.109 0.2394 0.0249 0.05 0 0 0.1469 0.0403 0.3541 0.0392 0.3384 0.0324
Plant and machine operators occ8 m 0.1112 0.0429 0 0 0.2226 0.0624 0 0 0.4902 0.0475 0.1478 0.056 0.1989 0.0346 0 0 0.1674 0.055 0 0 0.2457 0.0482 0.3431 0.0495 0 0
Part-time pt m -0.274 0.0424 -0.538 0.0214 0.0582 0.0788 -9E-04 0.0263 -0.596 0.0134 0.3573 0.065 0.1437 0.0286 -0.316 0.0375 -0.522 0.0555 -0.671 0.0269 -0.086 0.0523 0.3035 0.0736 -0.008 0.0432
Constant constant m 3.6461 0.0855 4.9696 0.1089 3.4317 0.1745 2.9463 0.1533 1.9897 0.0498 6.1204 0.2289 0.8951 0.1381 1.6541 0.0581 4.8951 0.149 1.9964 0.075 5.5226 0.138 5.1398 0.1571 0.8785 0.1083
Standard Error sd m 0.5325 0 0.5642 0 0.5853 0 0.5682 0 0.5183 0 0.5636 0 0.4414 0 0.5758 0 0.4888 0 0.5806 0 0.5926 0 0.7437 0 0.437 0
Lambda lambda m -0.473 0.0137 -0.775 0.1431 -0.573 0.149 -0.677 0.0508 -0.884 0.1129 -0.486 0.0962 -0.288 0.0934 -0.332 0.0036 -0.279 0.1066 -0.564 0.0063 -0.589 0.0997 -0.664 0.0829 -0.369 0.0615
Participation Equation
Marital Status marr p m 0.4343 0.0846 0.7498 0.0468 0.8154 0.108 0.9122 0.0589 0.4771 0.0346 0.6678 0.0853 0.6493 0.0831 0.6153 0.063 0.5944 0.1263 0.8011 0.0686 0.6777 0.0771 0.9045 0.0675 0.8188 0.0652
Cohabitting partner p m 0.3835 0.1429 0.337 0.0546 0.3903 0.1035 0.8675 0.072 0.3838 0.0388 0.8215 0.2636 0 0 1.2659 0.5532 0.5962 0.1705 0.696 0.088 0.407 0.1944 0.6407 0.1726 0.5088 0.0866
Years In Education yrsed p m 0.0856 0.0143 0.0303 0.0124 0.082 0.0146 0.0378 0.0065 0.0528 0.0041 0.0953 0.0114 0.0753 0.0072 -4E-04 0.0061 0.1359 0.0148 0.0565 0.0091 -0.032 0.013 0.0556 0.0071 0.036 0.0098
Years of Experience tpm 0.1104 0.0111 0.2017 0.0114 0.0502 0.013 0.1506 0.0062 0.0361 0.0066 0.1669 0.0095 0.0343 0.0067 0.1251 0.0065 0.1975 0.0157 0.0723 0.0086 0.1174 0.0097 0.1277 0.0073 0.0654 0.0081
Years of Experience^2 t2 p m -0.003 0.0002 -0.004 0.0002 -0.001 0.0003 -0.003 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.004 0.0002 -8E-04 0.0001 -0.003 0.0001 -0.004 0.0003 -0.002 0.0002 -0.003 0.0002 -0.003 0.0002 -0.002 0.0002
Regional Unemp. Rate REGUNEMP p m -18.23 6.4621 -4.752 0.9489 0 0 -3.906 0.9281 -0.826 0.4723 -4.407 6.711 -1.524 0.861 -2.232 0.1646 0 . 0 . -4.876 1.3885 -1.306 0.4684 -4.801 1.315
No. of Chldren (aged - 0 -5) nch05 p m -0.006 0.0675 -0.196 0.037 -0.029 0.084 0.0608 0.0461 -0.023 0.032 0.0703 0.0746 -0.076 0.0491 0.2486 0.069 0.2445 0.134 -0.045 0.0563 0.0477 0.0709 -0.023 0.0627 -0.238 0.0426
No. of Chldren (aged - 6-10) nch610 p m 0.0259 0.0775 -0.115 0.0349 -0.119 0.0926 0.0742 0.0502 0.0488 0.0311 0.0605 0.0716 -0.137 0.0461 -0.01 0.057 0.0456 0.1533 -0.087 0.0505 0.1786 0.0735 0.0467 0.061 -0.16 0.0458
No. of Chldren (aged - 11-17) nch1117 p m 0.0851 0.0525 -0.239 0.0299 -0.054 0.0795 -0.264 0.0484 0.1442 0.0356 0.0126 0.0815 0.0254 0.0337 0.1704 0.0428 0.0069 0.1102 0.0748 0.0531 0.029 0.0448 -0.435 0.0556 -0.338 0.0526
Constant constant p m -0.387 0.2373 -0.923 0.2056 -0.683 0.1962 -0.735 0.1352 0.2868 0.0881 -2.01 0.6918 -0.511 0.2282 -0.448 0.1086 -1.975 0.2071 -0.185 0.1378 -0.066 0.1575 -1.148 0.1374 0.0586 0.191 
 
 
Note: for NL the occupational categories are 1: mentary; 2: lower; 3: intermediate; 4: higher; 5: scientific occupations Female AT BE DK FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PT SP UK
v. Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev Coeff Std. Dev.
Earnings Equation
Years In Education yrsed f 0.0543 0.0079 0.0658 0.0085 0.0412 0.0125 0.0837 0.0037 0.0508 0.0039 0.0925 0.0163 0.053 0.0063 0.0541 0.0083 0.058 0.0103 0.1032 0.0081 0.0133 0.007 0.044 0.0107 0.0488 0.0045
Years of Experience tf 0.0438 0.0056 0.1324 0.0098 0.0619 0.0078 0.0502 0.0054 0.0475 0.004 0.0953 0.0113 0.0389 0.0032 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0393 0.0081 0.0765 0.0057 0.0455 0.0126 0.0668 0.0094 0.0306 0.0032
Years of Experience^2 t2 f -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0024 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0006 8E-05 -0.0018 0.0003 -0.0008 9E-05 0 0 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0006 7E-05
Region 1 reg1 f 000000 0 . 0 2 1 7 0 . 1 7 8 4 0 . 1 2 9 2 0 . 0 8 8 1 - 0 . 0 7 2 9 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 1 6 8 6 0 . 0 2 8 300 - 0 . 0 1 4 9 0 . 0 5 0 500 0 . 2 0 5 9 0 . 0 5 8 1 0 . 0 1 1 6 0 . 0 9 3 7 0 . 0 0 6 7 0 . 0 7 0 3
Region 2 reg2 f 0 . 0 4 9 0 . 0 3 7 1 - 0 . 0 7 1 3 0 . 0 6 2 300 - 0 . 1 4 5 7 0 . 1 8 6 6 0 . 0 5 9 1 0 . 1 1 1 4 - 0 . 0 0 2 8 0 . 0 7 4 0 . 0 4 4 0 . 0 2 6 4000000 0 . 0 5 9 7 0 . 0 5 7 4 0 . 1 4 9 7 0 . 0 8 7 8 0 . 0 2 6 1 0 . 0 6 7 7
Region 3 reg3 f - 0 . 0 3 2 9 0 . 0 3 3 8 - 0 . 0 0 8 6 0 . 0 6 2 400 - 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 1 8 5 3 - 0 . 0 3 5 1 0 . 0 7 2 2 0 . 0 9 0 4 0 . 0 6 7 300 0 . 0 5 0 7 0 . 0 5 5 90000 0 . 2 4 7 1 0 . 0 6 0 4 0 . 1 3 5 6 0 . 0 9 2 5 0 . 0 1 0 4 0 . 0 6 6
Region 4 reg4 f 000000 - 0 . 0 5 8 1 0 . 1 8 3 4 - 0 . 1 7 2 3 0 . 1 4 5 20000 0 . 0 8 6 0 . 0 8 2 70000 0 . 0 5 4 8 0 . 0 6 9 8 - 0 . 0 0 3 3 0 . 0 9 1 5 0 . 0 1 6 3 0 . 0 6 7 5
Region 5 reg5 f 000000 - 0 . 0 6 6 6 0 . 1 8 3 1 - 0 . 0 4 6 5 0 . 0 6 7 40000 - 0 . 0 5 9 4 0 . 0 6 5 70000 0 . 0 6 5 8 0 . 0 6 4 1 0 . 1 3 5 3 0 . 0 8 3 9 - 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 . 0 6 6 9
Region 6 reg6 f 000000 - 0 . 1 7 2 4 0 . 1 8 7 0 . 0 3 2 1 0 . 0 7 3 80000 0 . 0 9 1 2 0 . 0 7 7 40000 0 . 1 2 6 2 0 . 0 6 8 - 0 . 0 7 8 1 0 . 0 8 9 1 - 0 . 0 3 0 4 0 . 0 7 4 7
Region 7 reg7 f 000000 - 0 . 1 0 6 8 0 . 1 8 5 6 - 0 . 0 6 7 6 0 . 0 7 6 10000 - 0 . 0 7 3 0 . 0 7 7 300000000 0 . 2 7 2 1 0 . 0 6 5 8
Region 8 reg8 f 000000 - 0 . 1 7 4 7 0 . 1 8 0 8 0 . 0 4 4 9 0 . 0 6 9 50000 0 . 0 4 2 3 0 . 0 5 6 900000000 0 . 0 9 4 7 0 . 0 6 3 9
Region 9 reg9 f 000000 - 0 . 1 3 3 5 0 . 1 8 2 6 0 . 0 8 7 7 0 . 0 6 9 20000 - 0 . 0 3 1 2 0 . 0 6 2 900000000 0 . 0 4 4 9 0 . 0 6 6 6
Region 10 reg10 f 000000 - 0 . 0 4 8 2 0 . 1 8 3 7000000 - 0 . 2 0 5 6 0 . 0 8 1 300000000 - 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 7 2 6
Region 11 reg11 f 000000 - 0 . 2 2 8 2 0 . 1 8 6 6 - 0 . 1 6 2 3 0 . 0 9 6 20000 - 0 . 1 0 9 7 0 . 0 6 8 500000000 0 . 0 6 9 6 0 . 0 6 7 4
Region 12 reg12 f 000000 - 0 . 1 0 3 2 0 . 1 8 0 9 - 0 . 2 1 4 3 0 . 0 8 4 80000 - 0 . 2 9 3 2 0 . 0 7 0 80000000000
Region 13 reg13 f 000000 - 0 . 2 2 8 8 0 . 1 8 1 9 - 0 . 3 0 3 0 . 0 7 90000 - 0 . 0 7 1 3 0 . 0 7 7 70000000000
Region 14 reg14 f 000000 - 0 . 1 1 9 6 0 . 1 8 5 6 - 0 . 3 1 7 8 0 . 0 7 6 70000 - 0 . 0 9 9 9 0 . 1 9 2 20000000000
Region 15 reg15 f 000000 - 0 . 1 7 8 1 0 . 1 8 1 8 - 0 . 3 6 3 9 0 . 0 7 80000 - 0 . 3 3 0 1 0 . 0 7 3 60000000000
Region 16 reg16 f 000000 - 0 . 1 8 5 9 0 . 1 8 2 7 - 0 . 3 7 5 8 0 . 0 7 1 60000 - 0 . 3 1 1 6 0 . 0 7 3 80000000000
Region 17 reg17 f 000000 - 0 . 1 8 8 9 0 . 1 9 6 6000000 0 . 0 2 8 6 0 . 1 4 9 60000000000
Region 18 reg18 f 000000 - 0 . 1 6 4 6 0 . 1 7 9 7000000 - 0 . 2 3 3 1 0 . 0 9 7 20000000000
Region 19 reg19 f 000000 - 0 . 2 9 1 2 0 . 1 8 8 4000000 - 0 . 2 1 9 4 0 . 0 8 20000000000
Region 20 reg20 f 000000 - 0 . 1 5 2 7 0 . 1 8 4000000 - 0 . 2 1 9 5 0 . 0 8 7 90000000000
Region 21 reg21 f 000000 - 0 . 0 9 0 4 0 . 1 8 0 3000000000000000000
Region 22 reg22 f 00000000000000000000000000
Armed forces occ0 f 00000000000000000000 0 . 4 3 3 4 0 . 1 0 5 20000
Senior officials/managers occ1 f 0.4486 0.0952 0 0 0.3127 0.1084 0 0 1.181 0.0368 -0.1605 0.1554 0.2743 0.0796 0.9002 0.1701 0.2013 0.1647 0.2386 0.0749 0.4066 0.1688 0.4749 0.1696 0.4824 0.0332
Professionals occ2 f 0.5375 0.0727 0 0 0.3992 0.0707 0 0 1.3412 0.1222 0.666 0.0824 0.7505 0.0455 0 0 0.682 0.0966 0.429 0.0507 1.5088 0.079 1.1138 0.0784 0.6463 0.0579
Technicians occ3 f 0.4476 0.0536 0 0 0.2268 0.0629 0 0 1.0675 0.0339 0.562 0.0837 0.497 0.0526 0.7391 0.0494 0.4952 0.077 0 0 1.1857 0.0568 0.8614 0.0774 0 0
Clerks occ4 f 0.3813 0.0476 0 0 0.2869 0.0594 0 0 0.8008 0.0408 0.437 0.0678 0.2579 0.0409 0.4306 0.0365 0.2459 0.0685 0.5074 0.0519 0.5905 0.0562 0.7193 0.0632 0 0
Service and sales workers occ5 f 0.1762 0.0482 0 0 0.0666 0.058 0 0 0.7951 0.0385 0.1855 0.0697 -0.1158 0.0381 0 0 -0.179 0.0702 0 0 0.0444 0.0499 0.4234 0.0564 0.1005 0.0234
Skilled agricultural occ6 f 0.054 0.1064 0 0 -0.5552 0.1825 0 0 0.6967 0.1164 -1.0179 0.1706 -0.195 0.3161 0 0 -0.1397 0.2992 0 0 -0.6559 0.11 0.4607 0.2785 -1.8665 0.1978
Craft and trades workers occ7 f 0.2227 0.0665 0 0 0.2122 0.131 0 0 0.8656 0.0446 0.1154 0.0778 0.1041 0.0903 -1.5208 0.3756 -0.3323 0.1626 0 0 -0.0443 0.0628 0.3021 0.0879 0.4594 0.0305
Plant and machine operators occ8 f 0.516 0.0897 0 0 0.0914 0.094 0 0 0.9367 0.1257 0.3612 0.1187 0.1523 0.0523 0 0 -0.2294 0.1669 0 0 0.0964 0.0823 0.2235 0.1319 0 0
Part-time pt f -0.0702 0.0347 -0.3012 0.0416 0.2178 0.0425 -0.1317 0.0211 -0.385 0.0247 0.3209 0.0578 -0.026 0.0265 0.0029 0.0317 -0.3304 0.0504 -0.3787 0.0395 -0.2348 0.0424 0.3342 0.0503 -0.1263 0.0192
Constant constant f 3.3449 0.1117 3.6647 0.1832 3.0175 0.2799 2.5527 0.215 0.9888 0.1194 4.1299 0.4096 0.1828 0.1238 1.142 0.2252 4.8842 0.1573 0.529 0.1458 5.1152 0.2802 4.6766 0.2747 0.6621 0.101
Standard Error sd f 0.638 0 0.6718 0 0.6091 0 0.6374 0 0.6033 0 0.5884 0 0.4433 0 0.6465 0 0.6577 0 0.8169 0 0.6749 0 0.8244 0 0.4397 0
Lambda lambda f -0.5111 0.0271 0.0863 0.0655 -0.2709 0.1975 -0.1974 0.0696 -0.1183 0.0585 0.3563 0.1247 0.2165 0.0665 -0.0524 0.106 -0.1848 0.0885 -0.0188 0.0861 -0.137 0.1904 -0.4233 0.1117 -0.0325 0.044
Participation Equation
Marital Status marr p f -0.1359 0.0605 0.1121 0.0791 0.2967 0.0846 0.004 0.042 -0.0237 0.0528 -0.4454 0.0637 -0.0347 0.0677 -0.3881 0.0501 -0.398 0.0794 0.0876 0.0741 0.1628 0.0548 -0.1565 0.0536 0.3287 0.0489
Cohabitting partner p f 0.1625 0.1026 0.3194 0.1243 0.1696 0.0895 0.3231 0.0548 0.3023 0.0774 -0.0063 0.2351 0 0 0.1961 0.2626 0.5284 0.1278 0.3802 0.1022 0.2298 0.1545 0.4247 0.1422 0.291 0.0783
Years In Education yrsed p f 0.0666 0.0118 0.065 0.0133 0.117 0.0125 0.082 0.0049 0.0507 0.0051 0.1605 0.0096 0.0807 0.0078 0.085 0.0054 0.052 0.0112 0.0556 0.009 0.0243 0.009 0.1269 0.0064 0.0737 0.009
Years of Experience tpf 0.0917 0.0106 0.177 0.0119 0.0531 0.0121 0.1523 0.0056 0.0562 0.0078 0.1276 0.0087 0.0423 0.0074 0.0977 0.0064 0.1013 0.0129 0.0411 0.0091 0.0997 0.0083 0.1416 0.0074 0.0753 0.0077
Years of Experience^2 t2 p f -0.0026 0.0002 -0.0042 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0003 -0.0033 0.0001 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0028 0.0002 -0.0015 0.0002 -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0028 0.0003 -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0023 0.0002 -0.0032 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0002
Regional Unemp. Rate REGUNEMP p f -6.3169 3.3961 -2.7926 1.0223 0 0 -4.4861 0.6071 0.1987 0.296 -1.9191 0.834 -0.2432 0.911 -2.4006 0.1502 0 . 0 . -2.3343 0.6121 -0.6493 0.3356 -0.791 1.6696
No. of Chldren (aged - 0 -5) nch05 p f -0.6167 0.0509 -0.158 0.0612 -0.3023 0.0596 -0.193 0.0281 -0.7131 0.0407 -0.0242 0.0542 -0.3248 0.0391 -0.0181 0.0424 -0.3649 0.0577 -0.4521 0.0437 -0.0439 0.0484 -0.2801 0.047 -0.6569 0.0367
No. of Chldren (aged - 6-10) nch610 p f -0.3643 0.0494 -0.2237 0.0561 -0.0459 0.069 -0.1789 0.0298 -0.2969 0.037 -0.1238 0.0513 -0.2438 0.0404 -0.1826 0.0421 -0.3729 0.0677 -0.3974 0.0445 -0.1126 0.0467 -0.2402 0.045 -0.3411 0.0369
No. of Chldren (aged - 11-17) nch1117 p f -0.2251 0.0392 -0.1645 0.0499 0.0108 0.0661 -0.3018 0.0259 -0.1036 0.0325 0.0488 0.0584 -0.1412 0.0288 -0.0659 0.0342 -0.3377 0.0627 -0.1924 0.0395 -0.1664 0.0332 -0.3063 0.0364 -0.2031 0.035
Constant constant p f -0.3737 0.2296 -1.1607 0.2481 -1.2426 0.1766 -0.997 0.1164 -0.0994 0.0968 -2.6851 0.2783 -0.8653 0.2025 -1.1081 0.1078 -0.4311 0.1672 0.0138 0.1433 -0.7077 0.1312 -2.2316 0.1492 -0.7424 0.1739 
 
Note: for NL the occupational categories are 1: mentary; 2: lower; 3: intermediate; 4: higher; 5: scientific occupations 
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